For a decade I lectured on solar energy, renewable technologies, energy conservation, and Legionnaires' disease. I represented BRE on UK and international committees.

Friction with the NRPB (National Radiological Protection Board) began soon after I took over BRE's radon work for DOE in January 1988. It intensified over 3 years as positions became entrenched.

I organised radon research in hundreds of houses and using thousands of radon detectors. I had been told not to do this because it was 'not BRE's business'. I argued that confirming the reliability of passive detectors used in BRE studies in private houses was both in the public interest and a good scientific use of a mere £10,000 - and my supervisor reluctantly approved the money. The NRPB were acutely annoyed - because they considered themselves the experts in charge of UK calibration standards. Regularly, I explained 'radon politics', including to dozens of journalists. Always, I argued that radon should be treated as a health problem and that it should not be taken out of perspective because it was connected with radiation. This too was a cause of ongoing friction.

One argument was to contrast the number of avoidable non-smoking radon deaths with those caused by passive smoking, and the risks from radon with those of other domestic issues. My views were supported by many BRE and a few US scientists, and by some DOE personnel. However, the extent of policy differences were never known publicly in the UK, unlike in the USA.

Matters came to a head late in March 1991 with an unexpectedly high (12%) response to DOE's offer of free radon tests in Devon and Cornwall. Ministers sensed an opportunity to make political capital in what could be portrayed as an environmental subject area. They were attracted by the prospect of a successful campaign with positive headlines and that would cost the government very little - because most householders would have to pay for their own remedial work.

Also, Ministers wanted some 'environmental' kudos at a time the government was under pressure on this front. The fact that (logically) radon was not an environmental issue at all was deftly brushed aside. Notwithstanding these minor difficulties, Ministers ordered that the rift with NRPB be closed, and that a 'united front' be presented. This was despite the fact that my views had for years been accepted as logical as DoE and NRPB sparred with each other behind the scenes. I was summoned for interview. My Director and the then Deputy Chief Executive of BRE were present. They handed me a new job description in a wholly alien field - which they knew I would reject:

Earlier, in September 1990, I had submitted 3 abstracts of research papers to an EPA radon symposium in the USA. All three were accepted, but BRE ordered that they be withdrawn. (see 36 & 44). On 13 March 1991 (non-smoking day!) I gave a controversial and wide-ranging radon lecture to about 70 scientific colleagues at BRE.

A few days later I offered to write a range of BRE papers for publication, to contain a distillation of my research work since January 1988 - including confirmation that there were serious problems with the calibration of passive radon detectors (this meant that many reported results for UK housing in Devon and Cornwall were probably seriously in error!). Four days later I was removed from my position.

My results showing a lamentable failure of calibration standards for radon detectors had by then been classified under the Official Secrets Act by Dr Martin Jones of DoE Policy Branch, aided and abetted by Dr Elizabeth Dron. These were both accomplished and knowledgeable people who worked in HMIP (a part of one of the Policy Directorates of DoE at the time). They were well aware of the extent to which two senior staff of NRPB had been playing the radon issue for their own 'political' ends, and indeed they had sought for years to limit their influence. Dr Dron in particular was thoroughly exasperated with the whole mess - and once told me so. But they too had careers to protect.

In September 1991 I obtained unconditional approval from the Department (via the Cabinet Office) to set up a private Consultancy upon resignation. Later I was suspended for test-marketing this Consultancy, despite it being permitted for Civil Servants to apply for and obtain other work before they resign, and to run businesses (and many did and still do). A 'show trial' followed, with BRE Personnel Officers being acutely embarrassed by the roles they were forced to play. The Civil Service Appeal Board ruled I should be re-instated - but this could only ever be a recommendation. Full details will be published later - it is an interesting story and one of the first examples of how Government Ministers in the UK exercised direct control over 'internal' staff matters of the Service. The process has continued, with nowadays (in 2006) almost every senior appointment being politically vetted. With hindsight, the decay started with the move to Executive Agency status under the Tories but it was left to Tony Blair and New Labour to saturate the whole of public service with 'spin', 'cronyism' and institutionalised dishonesty.

In summary, as one of BRE's Principal Scientific Officers (PSOs) for over ten years, and as BRE's radon expert for over three, I had been prevented from publishing my radon work, banned from TV and radio, largely prevented from lecturing, supported only partially in my arguments with NRPB, and finally dismissed. It was alleged (and not denied) at the subsequent Tribunal that the Tory Minister Tony Baldry had directly ordered my dismissal. Later, as the Treasury Solicitors became wary of losing a full scale Industrial Tribunal, a leading London law firm were employed to 'negotiate' a settlement. As a part of this, the DoE conceded that my dismissal was 'unfair' - apparently the first time this had been openly admitted in the history of the UK Scientific Civil Service.

In the days before BRE became an Executive Agency with the Chief Executive wholly beholden to Ministers, Baldry (or any other junior Minister of limited ability) would have been reminded by a senior Civil Servant where his remit ended. But in the new world of short term contracts and 'spin' and with promotion and career prospects being determined not by ability and performance but by perceived 'obedience', the Chief Executive perhaps thought he had little choice but to follow orders.