Environmental Assessment of
Buildings and Building Developments
- a logical methodology for the world.
4 A DISCUSSION OF BREEAM
The Building Research Establishment's Environmental Assessment Method may now be examined. BREEAM 1/90 (6) contains the assertion that one of its main objectives is to avoid false claims of environmental friendliness, yet a building developed on an environmentally sensitive site could score highly by attention to a number of trivial details. Giving simple 'credits' over disparate areas invites summation, despite that this is argued against within the method. BREEAM 1/90 has recently been reissued as BREEAM 1/93 and with a few changes. Many buildings have been assessed, and with the consequent publicity sometimes claiming "19 out of a possible 21 points!"
Also, the BREEAM method of separating issues into Global, Neighbourhood and Indoor is flawed. For example, it is not necessary to classify Legionnaires' disease as both a Neighbourhood and an Indoor Effect. It is simply a health issue. Likewise, asbestos is a very minor health issue. It does not make sense to classify it as an Indoor Effect, since in many cases the concern is to the neighbourhood upon demolition of the building, or in a fire. Indoor airborne levels of asbestos are often very low until the material is disturbed, and in any case it is now recognised that much of the effort expended on removal of asbestos from buildings has been a waste of money (49).
In view of the inherent difficulties with BREEAM, its modest success needs to be explained. There are six main factors.
• in the run-up to the Environment White Paper (23) 'green' Departmental initiatives were enthusiastically supported
• several well known developers lent support at a time when BRE had to demonstrate increased direct cooperation with industry
• it was the first method to be published
• public money was subsequently devoted to glossy presentation, marketing and promotion both in the UK and overseas
• association of a label with the name of BRE lent credibility to disparate buildings at low cost
• such was the influence of BRE that no UK organisation that hoped to obtain official funding for buildings research or development dared speak out against a BRE initiative.
Thus, BREEAM became a success despite its inadequacy. A few BRE scientists warned of possible consequences but were ignored. It is a reflection of the monopoly position of funding from which BRE has benefited for decades that any BRE idea can quickly receive commendation and may by default become the accepted wisdom. It appears not yet to be widely appreciated the extent to which some present-day BRE pronouncements lack any basis in enquiry or study.
The monopoly continues to some extent, augmented by undue influence on selection of topics and projects to be supported at other centres. BRE benefits from an unfair competitive advantage, especially now that it has launched into private consultancy. For many years it has been the policy not to support proposals from rival organisations that were in areas preferred by BRE for its own projects, or that were seen to offer potential competition.
The importance of BRE being seen to cooperate with outside groups is reflected in the lengthy list of other contributors to development of BREEAM. Just about every organisation who offered more than three words of comment on early drafts is credited. More recently, a number of sympathetic companies have been organised into a development unit to help perpetuate the illusion of universal acclaim. A review of BREEAM was also undertaken by consultants. No report was published.
Up to 1992, well over 50 major buildings were submitted for assessment. This is not however an endorsement of BREEAM. It is (merely) a reflection of the fact that a few developers calculated that £2000 was a small price to pay for what they hoped would be perceived by others to be a Department of Environment Approval of their building.
The degree to which BREEAM has been over-hyped is illustrated by a BRE Press Release: (50)
"to achieve credits on the green label of a BREEAM certificate a building MUST BE MUCH LESS ENVIRONMENTALLY DAMAGING TO ......THOSE WHO WILL OCCUPY THE BUILDING THAN ONE BUILT TO NORMAL PRACTICE." (emphasis added)
There is no such requirement. BRE scientists warned as early as 1989 that the credit rating approach was flawed because
• credits would inevitably be added together to produce a meaningless total score and
• buildings with an appalling environmental impact could achieve high scores because of the lack of proper consideration of habitat and site issues
Since those early days another significant weakness of the scheme has come into focus - that thoughtfully designed buildings could achieve only a low score because they were disadvantaged by the chosen site, yet in overall environmental terms were probably better than alternatives that could have been built on green field sites. The case studies in Section 6 provide examples.
BREEAM was conceived in the wake of the BRE Low Energy Office (51) and hurriedly published to achieve green credibility and government funding at an auspicious moment - when the Department of the Environment was scurrying around earnestly seeking ways to green its image. The view was taken that anything that would sell well and enhance market profile could not be delayed - not even to rectify deficiencies. It is therefore not surprising that a new and more logical framework was seen to be required by potential users.
In a new version of BREEAM for assessment of existing offices (52), there is no mention of habitat issues despite that for some sites, maintenance and sensitive development of the grounds, woodland, etc, should be as much a part of Company policy as providing a covered shed for bicycles, and for which the method awards points.
Proper consideration of habitat issues has never been a feature of BREEAM. This is probably because of the UK's poor record of maintaining its base of SSSIs. New Scientist magazine summarized some concerns in a recent editorial (53) to add to the chorus of discontent from environmental groups over the last twenty years.
However, in the supermarkets version of BREEAM (54) a credit can be gained by reusing an existing site to "slow down or halt the destruction of natural habitats and the wildlife they support". Similarly two credits can be awarded for avoiding building houses on ecologically valuable sites (55).
The suspicion therefore is that whilst habitat might continue to be mentioned for new developments if assessed at the design stage, the issue may be neatly avoided in assessments of existing buildings - when the damage has been done. BREEAM 4/93 for existing offices "can be applied at any time during the life of an existing building."
The UK has already lost a large fraction of its ancient woodlands and SSSIs. No credible scheme of environmental assessment should allow for a development whose construction caused significant and recent environmental damage to be lauded for environmental excellence. The damage must remain forever 'on the record'.
The BREEAM bandwagon continues to be subsidised by public funds. BREEAM remains largely irrelevant as a methodology to address the key issues of many developments. No version to date has recognised the importance of individual scoping of assessments. This is in line with the development of BREEAM outside the mainstream of Environmental Assessment. The methods are incapable of highlighting for analysis and discussion the special issues of some sites.
An example of how issues are tacked-on to BREEAM every time a new version is published is provided by the inclusion of radon in BREEAM 4/93. There is a legal requirement to test for radon in work-places in affected areas of the UK (56). The cautious limit of 400 Bq/m3 was strongly influenced by vested interests at NRPB (57) but international recommendations of 1000 Bq/m3 are now being discussed, in recognition of the low doses from work places (31). In contrast, the simplistic credit level in BREEAM is 200 Bq/m3. There is of course no supporting analysis for this, wholly in line with so little of BREEAM being underpinned by logic, marginal cost benefit calculations or peer review. It is disturbing that such inadequacy is now being exported to other European countries and beyond, and may even form the basis of Euro-audits.
The inclusion of an ill-thought-through radon credit would be amusing were it not for the expense that might be incurred were many people to take BREEAM seriously. Buildings basements may easily register over 200 Bq/m3 outside affected areas (a fact that seems to have escaped the authors of BREEAM) and even basement levels of 5,000 Bq/m3 are little concern so long as the rooms are not regularly occupied for many hours. Also, the methods of assessment for radon and for many other issues seem so ill defined as to be pathetic.